Georgia: 'A Far-off Country...'? by Lanskoy, Miriam
Boston University
OpenBU http://open.bu.edu
Institute for the Study of Conflict, Ideology and Policy Perspective
1997-01




Volume 7, No 3 (January-February 1997)
Georgia: 'A Far-off Country...'?
By MIRIAM LANSKOY
Managing Editor
For the last three years President Eduard Shevardnadze has justified the continued 
presence of Russian peacekeepers, border guards and military bases on Georgian 
territory by arguing that only Russia can restore Georgia's territorial integrity with regard 
to the secessionist autonomies of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. During that time, Russia 
has not kept its part of the bargain and no progress has been made to facilitate the 
return of over nearly a quarter of a million Georgian refugees expelled from Abkhazia or 
to resolve the question of Abkhazia's future status. On the contrary, both South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia recently held elections in an effort to garner greater legitimacy for their 
regimes and South Ossetia signed a friendship and cooperation treaty with North 
Ossetia--a part of the Russian Federation--which would facilitate their integration.
As their patience with this arrangement has grown thin, the Georgian members of 
parliament have initiated measures to evict the Russian military and resolve the conflicts 
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia without Russian mediation. Shevardnadze has taken 
a more cautious line, reaffirming the "special relationship" with Russia, but also has 
refrained from challenging the increasingly confrontational parliamentary initiatives. His 
hesitation to take a bolder tone (which would only ingratiate him with his domestic 
constituency) is a reflection of the near total abandonment of Georgia by the West in 
general and by the US Administration in particular. If even in a matter as pressing and 
noncontentious as removing spent nuclear fuel rods from Georgia the White House and 
State Department were too timid to operate independently in "Russia's sphere," there 
seems little hope for any support on the more fundamental issue of restoring Georgia 
from partition and occupation. (1)
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Over the same three-year period in which Georgia's population has grown increasingly 
weary of the Russian garrisons, Georgia's strategic importance for Russia has been 
enhanced further. As Chechnya emerges from the war as an increasingly independent 
entity with no Russian forces on its territory (an outcome that no doubt emboldens the 
Georgian opposition), Russia will be even more reluctant to loosen its stranglehold on 
the country which constitutes Chechnya's only neighbor outside the Russian Federation. 
In addition to being again the locale for Russian ports and naval installations on the 
Black Sea coast (including Batumi, the capital of the Ajarian region (2) ), Georgia is 
slated to become a transit route for Caspian oil bound for Turkey. That the path 
projected for Caspian oil would terminate at Supsa just north of Batumi illuminates 
Ajaria's significance; Russia's desire to retain a monopoly on oil transit is as strong as 
its desire to maintain hegemony in the Caucasus. In the face of rising passions in 
Georgia, the Russian military is using the same bullying tactics that served it so well in 
the past. Two recent incidents in particular--Russia's detention of the Ukrainian ship 
Almaz in Georgian territorial waters and the threat of Russian-inspired incipient 
separatism in Ajaria--have placed severe stress on the relationship.
Georgian Parliament vs. The Occupiers
On October 2, 1996 a parliamentary resolution called on President Shevardnadze to 
form a delegation to hold talks with the Russian leadership and report on the entire 
spectrum of Russian-Georgian relations, including: the continued presence of Russian 
peacekeepers in Abkhazia after the end of their mandate on January 31, 1997; the 
existence of Russian military bases in Georgia (governed by a treaty that has not been 
ratified by either country's parliament); and future border protection arrangements. The 
parliament also instructed Georgia's security and interior ministries to draw up specific 
measures in the event that peacekeepers withdraw from the conflict zone.(3) 
Subsequently, this Georgian delegation's meeting with the Russian foreign minister, 
Yevgeni Primakov, produced little more than yet another Russian promise to repatriate 
Georgian refugees to Abkhazia in January of 1997. (4)
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A week after the resolution was passed, Russian peacekeepers in Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia as well as Russian units stationed in Ajaria were placed on high alert. Units of 
the Black Sea Fleet in the Georgian ports of Poti, Sukhumi, and Batumi were also put 
on a higher level of readiness. Traffic between Tbilisi and Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
was "brought to a minimum." Clashes between Abkhaz clans in Sukhumi (in anticipation 
of the November 23, 1996 Abkhaz elections) may have been the target of the exercise. 
However, the Georgian media described the Russian actions as a response to the 
Georgian parliamentary resolution and the parliament's continued resistance to Russian 
efforts to codify the Russian border guard presence on the external borders of the CIS 
member states. (5) Whereas the existing border guard arrangements are governed by a 
series of bilateral agreements, Russia seeks approval of a CIS-wide document; "The 
Draft Declaration on the Principles of Establishing and Maintaining the Regime 
Governing the External Borders of the CIS" would obligate each CIS state to control its 
external borders jointly with the Russian border guards. Signing this document 
constitutes a precondition for participating in the CIS Customs Union, Russia's other 
integration initiative. (6)
In mid-October the Georgian police broke up a rally demanding the withdrawal of 
Russian troops that was staged in front of the Russian embassy. Still, about 20 
protesters managed to get to the embassy and several others were detained. (7) At the 
end of October, the parliament unanimously rejected an amendment to the Bill on the 
State Border regulating the presence of Russian border guards on Georgian territory. 
That amendment would have changed the current text, namely, that the protection of 
Georgia's borders is the exclusive prerogative of Georgian border guards. However, the 
deputies agreed that the president can regularize Russian troop presence on Georgia's 
border with Turkey by signing a decree to that effect. (8) At the same time a 
parliamentary committee uniting 17 opposition parties formed to "end Russian 
occupation" and vowed to work until the last Russian soldier leaves. (9)
In December of 1996, a committee of three political parties circulated a statement 
calling for the removal of Russian peacekeepers and asking the Georgian government 
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to bar Russia from participating in talks with Abkhazia, since the authors have "always 
deemed the war in Abkhazia a political conflict, instigated with Russia's direct 
participation." The deputies suggested that OSCE/UN mediation and international 
peacekeepers should replace the Russian presence. (10) In January, with the 
peacekeeping mandate running out and the CIS summit which was expected to 
consider and extend the mandate delayed due to President Yel'tsin's ill health, Georgia's 
air traffic controllers stopped Russian cargo planes from flying over Georgian airspace 
to make deliveries to the peacekeepers in Abkhazia. (11)
Direct talks between Georgian and Abkhaz representatives were initiated in the fall of 
1996. On his return from Abkhazia on January 9, 1997 the Georgian foreign minister, 
Irakli Menagharashvili, spoke of a "dramatic step forward" while Shevardnadze 
announced his willingness to meet with the Abkhaz leader Vladislav Ardzinba if "specific 
decisions," presumably on repatriation of ethnic Georgian refugees, could be prepared. 
(12) Similarly the speaker of the Georgian parliament, Zurab Zhvania, returned from the 
first high-level visit to South Ossetia in five years on January 20. (13)
Russian Border Guards Respond
On December 4, Russian border guards detained a Ukrainian ship, Almaz, in Georgia's 
territorial waters near Batumi and removed its captain and eleven-person crew to 
Russia, where they were held for several days. The Russian border guards failed even 
to notify the Georgian government of their action. This incident--characterized by 
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze as piracy and by the deputy foreign minister, 
Malkaz Kakabadze, as a move just short of a declaration of war--constitutes one 
response to early signs of Georgia's growing assertiveness. (14) The other comes in the 
form of actions calculated to threaten separatism in Ajaria.
This region on the Black Sea coast hosts a Russian naval base near its capital Batumi 
and Russian border guards on the border with Turkey. A small Russian minority resides 
there but, unlike Abkhazia or South Ossetia, Ajarians do not represent a separate 
nationality. The 1989 census did not list Ajar as a nationality; the region is inhabited 
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mainly by Georgians, some of whom profess Islam. Headed by the chairman of the 
Supreme Soviet, Aslan Abashidze, who was appointed in 1991 by former Georgian 
President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Ajaria until recently had remained loyal to Georgia. 
However, due to his close ties to the Russian military, Abashidze has been able to 
assert Ajarian interests against the central government. In mid-October 1996, while the 
parliament was working to remove the Russian presence, Abashidze declared that the 
Russian troops in his republic "were and remain a guarantor of stability."(15)
Shortly after the Almaz was detained, a visit to Batumi by the director of the Russian 
Border Service, General Andrei Nikolayev, was canceled abruptly because it had not 
been coordinated with the Georgian border troops. Instead, Nikolayev's deputy held 
talks with the Ajarian leadership on December 7.(16) A few days later Nikolayev ordered 
the border linking Georgia's South Ossetian Autonomous Oblast' with Russia's North 
Ossetian Autonomous Republic closed to all movement of goods and people. He 
supported the action by citing a 1994 moratorium on border traffic in connection with the 
war in Chechnya which had never been implemented: "It is being implemented now 
because the Russian government deems it necessary." (17)
Another portent of Russian intentions came on December 12 when Russia's Duma 
Speaker, Gennadi Seleznev, in his address to Georgian parliamentarians, included a 
plea for establishing a Russian Consulate General in Batumi. (18) In this highly 
controversial speech, Seleznev also called for easing the economic sanctions on 
Abkhazia and voiced his concern over "the organized campaign to drive out the 
Russian-speaking community."(19) Not surprisingly, these remarks struck a very raw 
nerve in the parliament--the People's National Democratic Party staged a walkout and 
two other parties, the Georgian Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union, 
joined it in calling for Shevardnadze not to "make the same mistake in the future and 
allow a representative of the country with which Georgia has no clear prospects for 
normal relations to take the rostrum of Georgia's supreme legislative body." (20)
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On December 16 Georgian newspapers carried a report that Russian armored vehicles 
besieged the Supreme Council of Ajaria, government buildings, the post office, 
telegraph, and television center. Accounts of the incident varied, with some sources 
claiming that the Russians were apprehending saboteurs who had penetrated the city. 
The Transcaucasus group of Russian forces explained that this was a regular military 
exercise. (21) For his part, Abashidze stated that the republican law enforcement 
agencies held a preventive exercise in which they took control of Ajaria's administrative 
border with Georgia in order to "stop armed groups wearing Georgian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs uniforms from entering Ajaria." (22)
In its press release, the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs stated that there was no 
attempt by armed formations to penetrate Ajaria and pointed out that the Ajarian Ministry  
of Internal Affairs could hardly have been responsible for the incident since it has no 
armored vehicles of its own. The Georgian ministry offered assistance to Ajaria's law 
enforcement organs and was told that the situation was normal and no help was 
necessary. The statement emphasized that relations between the ministries of Internal 
Affairs of Ajaria and Georgia are built on the principle of subordination. (23)
For the time being the Georgian government defused the situation by holding joint 
meetings with the Ajar government in late December. As a result of these sessions, 
Ajaria was allowed to retain customs duties which were originally bound for the central 
budget. At the same time Shevardnadze stressed that the arrangement will have to be 
approved by the Georgian parliament. (24)
Abazhidze's attempt to turn a purely administrative border into a guarded frontier, only 
days after Seleznev made a bid for Russian diplomatic representation, constitutes a 
blatant and calculated threat. These maneuvers lead to the conclusion that the Russian 
side has once again threatened Georgia's territorial integrity in order to keep military 
bases and border guards in place.
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